A Programme for Political Reform in Spain

In a democracy, the very existence of a political class is repugnant. The more mature a democracy, the better it will weather a political class's pursuit of its class interests. As Spanish democracy is not mature, it would benefit from formal changes designed to weaken the political class and its structures (e.g. patronage) in favour of more effective scrutiny of public life. Here are my suggestions:

1. Abolish the closed-list electoral system.
2. Reserve 75% of parliamentary seats for small electoral districts, each sending a single representative to parliament. Use an alternative vote or instant run-off system for voting in these constituencies.
3. Reserve 25% of parliamentary seats for open party lists to allow for ideological as well as territorial representation. Restrict anyone winning such a seat from serving more than two terms, unless he or she should run for and win an election in one of the small constituencies.
4. Require parties to choose local candidates democratically and locally, i.e. by open election in each electoral district. Restrict voting in such elections to local party members of at least one year's standing.
5. Require parties to choose open-list candidates openly and democratically, i.e. by open election among all party members of at least one year's standing.
6. Require parties to choose parliamentary leaders and members of the party executive openly and democratically, i.e. by open election among all party members of at least one year's standing. Set fixed terms for such offices.
7. Restrict all holders of elected offices from holding any discretionary appointments in the public sector for five years after they leave office. Remove all parliamentary privilege save that protecting holders of elected offices from prosecution for slander or libel for remarks made in an elected assembly. All other protection is either an admission that that the justice system is open to political manipulation or an invitation to break the law.
8. In municipalities, institute direct elections for mayor.
9. In municipalities where members of the municipal council are paid a full-time salary, restrict the number of council members in accordance with a sliding scale. (Some Catalan municipalities have one full-time councillor per 4500 inhabitants, under a city-wide closed-list electoral system. Over-representation is wasteful, an indirect subsidy for political parties.)
10. In municipalities whose population surpasses a set threshold (i.e. 20,000), institute an electoral system of districts or wards for council elections. Under the current system, neighbourhoods have no political voice.
11. Determine a fixed and very low percentage limit for the salaries of holders of discretionary posts, in relation to the overall budget for the municipality, autonomous community, or the state itself.
12. Remove the principle of parliamentary representation from the governance of public bodies such as public broadcasters and the choice of justices for the Constitutional and other Courts. Party interests are not the public interest. Public appointments commissions, reporting to the ombudsmen (e.g. the defensor/a del pueblo, the sindicatura de greuges), should recommend appointments on the basis of merit after open public competitions.
13. Ombudsmen themselves should be chosen by a 75%+1 parliamentary majority vote. If no parliamentary consensus is forthcoming, ombudsmen should be elected directly by popular vote in a special election free from party affiliation.
14. Charge the ombudsmen with assessing all public sector advertising and communication. Make it a duty of media outlets to refuse public sector advertising that is not primarily informative and in the public interest. Give the ombudsmen power to fine both advertiser and media outlet if any public-sector advertisement, paid communication or campaign is demonstrably propagandistic.
15. Finally, and perhaps most radically: adopt a federal structure. The distribution of powers is currently determined by legislation subject to the constitution and thus to greater judicial interpretation. Write the distribution of powers into the constitution and the room for dispute between levels of government would be minimal.